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Abstract 
 
 
Most papers on returns to languages are concerned with immigrants. We use the 
European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP) to infer returns on non-native 
languages by non-immigrants in nine countries of the European Union. We differ from 
the few other studies that deal with the same problem in three respects. First, we correct 
for time-dependent measurement errors in self-reporting as suggested by Dustmann and 
Van Soest and find that the resulting IV estimates are much larger than those obtained by 
OLS. We also suggest that there is little room for time-persistent errors and 
heterogeneity, and that therefore our estimates should not suffer from the other usual 
biases. Secondly, instead of using a dummy for each language, we use the ratio of the 
population that is not proficient in a language in each country considered. Finally, we 
estimate instrumental variable quantile regressions to illustrate how returns to languages 
vary at different points of the distribution of earnings. 
 
 
 
 
                                     
* Ginsburgh is also member of ECORE, the newly created association between CORE and ECARES. We are 
grateful to David Veredas for many enlightening discussions, and to participants of the ECORE Conference 
Challenges of Multilingual Societies, Brussels June 9-10, 2006. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
 
Globalization, increasing international trade flows, the establishment of new free-trade 
areas and the efficient performance of international “common markets” result from 
improvements in transportation, but also and probably even more so, from the ability of 
economic agents to communicate. Given new communication technologies, the only 
restrictions left are due to linguistic barriers.  Although English has become the current lingua 
franca (as was, in other times, Latin, and somewhat later, French) and is understood by 1.5 to 
1.8 billion citizens (Crystal, 2001), countries whose official tongues are not English represent 
a large share of the world’s GDP and their inhabitants may substantially improve their human 
capital if they know languages other than their own mother tongue (or English). However, 
one may expect that the more the official language of a country is international, the less 
important the economic advantage of its inhabitants to learn other languages, and the smaller 
the domestic language in a country, the higher the number of foreign languages speakers.1 
Obviously, not all languages will be equally rewarded by the labor market due both to supply 
and demand factors.  
Though languages are important in international transactions, the domestic relevance 
of language skills -- for example, the importance for immigrants to know the language spoken 
in the country to which they move -- is the topic of many papers. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
most papers on the returns of language proficiency deal with the skills of immigrants in 
"traditional" immigration countries such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.2 Only a couple of papers consider the case of natives in 
multilingual societies, such as Canada (Shapiro and Stelcner, 1997), Hungary (Galasi, 2003), 
Luxemburg (Klein, 2003), Switzerland (Cattaneo and Winkelman, 2003) and the United 
States (Fry and Lowell, 2003). Countries of the European Union before its last enlargement to 
the East (EU 15) are the subject of a paper by Williams (2005).  
 A second strand of research is concerned with the determinants of language 
acquisition by immigrants (Chiswick and Miller, 1995, 1996, 2003, Dustmann, 1994, 
Dustmann and Van Soest, 2001). Language proficiency is assumed to depend on three sets of 
factors: economic incentives linked to expected returns, individual efficiency in language 
acquisition, and exposure to the language prior to (and after) immigration.  
We concentrate on the returns of multilingualism in a certain number of countries of the 
European Union, thus following on three papers that considered the same issue. Galasi (2003) 
uses two Hungarian surveys of young career beginners who graduated from public higher 
education as full-time students in 1998 and 1999. His paper is devoted to the returns to 
                                     
1 See e.g. Ginsburgh, Ortuno-Ortin and Weber (2005) for a model and some empirical estimates. 
2 Australia (Chiswick and Miller, 1995), Canada (Abbott and Beach, 1992, Aydemir and Skuterud, 2005, 
Chiswick and Miller, 1995), Germany (Dustmann and Van Soest, 2002), Israel (Beenstock, Chiswick and 
Repetto, 2001, Berman, Lang and Siniver, 2003, Chiswick and Miller, 1995, Chiswick, 1998), the United 
Kingdom (Leslie and Lindley, 2001), and the United States (Bleakey and Chin, 2004, Bratsberg, Ragan and 
Nasir, 2002, Chiswick and Miller, 1995, 2002, Hellerstein and Neumark, 2003). 
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education rather than to languages. Due to this, he merely corrects for the usual bias in 
estimating the returns to education equation but not for the similar bias with respect to 
language proficiency. He finds that speaking English or German increases wages by some 6 
and 4 percent, respectively, although the results are not very robust to alternative 
specifications (in some cases, he even obtains negative, though insignificant, returns).  
In his paper on the returns to languages in Luxemburg, Klein (2003) concludes that 
there is little advantage to be proficient in any of the official languages (French, German and 
Luxemburgish), but it pays to know English, the only truly "foreign" language. 
The closest paper to ours is Williams (2005) who uses data from the European 
Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP) between 1994 and 1999. The information 
results from answers to the following question included in the surveys: "Does your work 
involve the use of a language other than (the official language of the country)?" Williams runs 
ordinary least squares Mincer-type regressions where the explanatory variables include a 
broad array of socio-economic indicators. To capture the effect of language knowledge, a 
dummy is introduced for each of the following languages if it is cited as the first foreign 
language used at the workplace of the respondent: English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, 
Dutch, “all other”. In an alternative specification, all languages are pooled, and only one 
coefficient is estimated. Equations are run for each EU 15 member state separately (with the 
exception of Sweden) in 1996. The results indicate that in Austria, Finland, Italy, Spain and 
the Netherlands, English is the only language that yields a significant return. However, 
substantial returns are also found for French in Denmark, Luxemburg, Greece and Portugal, 
while German generates positive and significant returns in Belgium, Luxemburg and France, 
Spanish does so in France, Italian in Luxemburg and Portuguese, and Dutch in Belgium. In 
the United Kingdom, no second language is rewarded. Languages add 5 to 20 percent to 
earnings, depending on the country and the language considered. 
 Our paper estimates returns to languages in nine European countries in 2001, a more 
recent year of the same panel survey as the one used by Williams. We differ in three respects 
from Williams. First, we try to take into account the endogeneity issue between languages and 
earnings. Secondly, instead of representing proficiency in languages by dummy variables (or 
by the level of efficiency), we use an indicator which makes a link with the “usefulness” of 
the language or the frequency with which it is spoken in a given country that is, the share of 
the population which does not know the language (the disenfranchisement rate). For 
individuals who only use the language of the country (French in France, for example), this 
share is zero (or close to 0 if the country hosts immigrants who do not speak the official 
language), while for a language that nobody knows but is useful at the workplace, it will be 
equal to 1. The parameter associated with the variable allows retrieving returns to languages 
for which one knows the disenfranchisement rate, and as long as the estimated parameter is 
positive, the returns will be larger for languages that are less common. Thirdly, following 
Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004, 2005 and 2006) instrumental variable quantile regression 
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estimator, we also estimate instrumental variable quantile regressions which illustrate how 
returns to languages vary at different points of the distribution of earnings. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the data used, the model, 
and the econometric problems that have to be faced in estimating such a model, as well as the 
results of the estimation of "mean" returns obtained by usual (instrumental variables) 
techniques. In Section 3, we turn to the results obtained by quantile (instrumental  variables) 
regressions which give more detailed information on the relation between language 
proficiency and earnings. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Data, the Model and Econometric Issues 
 
Data 
 
The database that we use is the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), 
which contains information on a panel of individuals in 15 European countries from 1994 to 
2001. This information is homogenous across countries since the surveys were coordinated by 
EUROSTAT, although the sample sizes vary across countries and years. The surveys describe 
the socio-economic characteristics of individuals older than 16, grouped by households, 
including personal characteristics, family structure, current employment, education and 
training, labor status, wages, family income from sources other than wages and salaries, 
region of residence, and languages used at the workplace.  
 Between 1994 and 1999, questions about language skills concerned first, second and 
third foreign languages used at the workplace. These questions were dropped in Belgium, 
Germany, Luxemburg and the United Kingdom between 1997 and 1999. Sweden joined the 
survey in 1997 but did not include the questions on languages. In 2000 and 2001, questions 
were formulated somewhat differently, and moved to another part of the questionnaire. 
Workers were asked to report on the main and second languages used “at their main job.”3 
We were faced with the following issues and possibilities: (a) we found inappropriate to 
merge both parts of the panel, i.e. 1994-1999 and 2000-2001, since the essential questions on 
languages changed after 2000; (b) we could have used panel techniques on the 1994-1999 
waves, with the exception of Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg and the United Kingdom for 
which only three years were available; (c) the waves 2000-2001 are more recent, the 
information is consistent, but running panel techniques with only two years is not very useful. 
We preferred to use the information contained in the 2000 survey to control for non-persistent 
time components of the error term.4  
                                     
3 In Spain, the question was formulated “main and second foreign language.” These questions were not part of 
the British and Swedish surveys and are not available for the Netherlands in 2001.  
4 Since we also run quantile regressions, this also allows us to compare the results of IV and quantile estimation. 
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 Though both parts of the panel include 15 countries, the questions on languages failed 
to be included for the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We left out Luxemburg 
and Belgium given their multilingual situation. Ireland was also dropped since the survey 
contains a very small number of respondents (less than 2 percent) who need a foreign 
language at their workplace.5  
 We also excluded immigrants from the sample, since the mechanisms that govern 
language acquisition differ for non-natives.6 Table 1 contains information on the number of 
observations in each country, as well as on the number of individuals who report needing one 
or several among the main European languages, that is English, French, German, Italian, 
Spanish and Dutch, as well as the official language of the country. 
 
 
Specification of the returns to languages equation 
 
The objective is to estimate the effect of language knowledge (and use at the 
workplace) on earnings. The standard (language-augmented) Mincer-type equation can be 
specified as: 
 
(1)   ln wi = xiβ + Diγ + ui 
 
for individuals i = 1, 2, ..., N, where the vector β and the scalar γ are parameters, wi represents 
the wage rate, xi is a vector of exogenous variables and ui is a random error. In the case of 
immigrants, Di is usually a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if individual i reports being 
proficient in the language of the country for which the equation is estimated, and 0 otherwise. 
In some cases, the variable represents various degrees of self-assessed proficiency in the 
language,7 but even then the variable is often coded as a dummy, equal to 1 if proficiency is 
larger than a given threshold, and 0 otherwise.8 When the equation is run to assess the returns 
of a foreign language, the dummy usually represents self-assessed knowledge of the non-
native language that individual i knows. In case of several languages, each language is 
represented by a dummy (Galasi, 2003, Williams, 2005). Bratsberg, Ragan and Nasir (2002) 
introduce a variable that takes the value 1 once an individual acquires the American 
citizenship.  
There is an important difference between our model and the usual one, in which the 
“language” variable is concerned with language proficiency of an individual. In our case, 
individuals self-report the language(s) used at their main workplace. Therefore, once a 
                                     
5 We did run regressions for Ireland, but the standard errors of the estimated parameters were very large, and 
almost no coefficient of interest was significantly different from zero. 
6 Women were also excluded since this would have increased heterogeneity and it is out of the scope of this 
paper to proceed to gender comparisons. 
7 See Berman, Lang and Siniver (2003), Chiswick and Miller (2002), Fry and Lowell (2003), 
8 See e.g. Dustmann and Van Soest (2002). 
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language is mentioned, it measures not only knowledge, but also what the firm needs, that is, 
the demand side. This will have an influence on the estimation procedure. 
 
 
Econometric issues 
 
The returns to languages equation is subject to unobserved heterogeneity similar to the 
one faced in the returns to education literature, which tries to assess the effect of education on 
earnings: both education and earnings may be dependent on unobservable individual skills 
and talent. Explanatory variables, in particular Di are correlated with the error term in 
equation (1). This yields biased ordinary least squares estimates, and overestimates the 
parameters of interest. The solution pursued in the literature on private returns to education is 
to use instruments for education (such as time of admission, see Angrist and Krueger, 1991), 
or to rely on natural experiments (such as educational outcomes and earnings of identical 
twins, see Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994).  
 The same issue is pervasive in the returns to language acquisition equation, and needs 
instrumental variable estimation. Chiswick and Miller (1995) use the following instruments 
for language fluency: number and age of children, individual married overseas, and minority-
language concentration of the place of residence, defined as the proportion of the population 
in the region who report the same minority language, and in which the respondent lives.9 The 
latter variable has been criticized since it may be considered a choice variable, and as 
observed by Bleakey and Chin (2004), regional characteristics correlated with the 
concentration ratio may have effects on earnings. Dustmann and Van Soest (2002) use the 
father's education level. Bleakey and Chin (2004) use age at arrival of the immigrant 
interacted with a dummy for non-English speaking country of origin as identifying 
instrument. This allows taking into account the possible effect of easier adaptation of an 
immigrant when he moves at a young age. Galasi (2003) who studies the return of foreign 
languages in Hungary uses scores obtained by individuals when they took their higher-
education admission exam.  
 A second issue, related to misclassified language indicators, is discussed by Dustmann 
and Van Soest (2001).10 In panel (or cross-section) data, language ability is usually self-
reported. This is certainly so when individuals report on their level of language proficiency 
using an ordinal scale, but also when their answer is dichotomous (yes or no). Two types of 
errors affect these variables: a purely random error, that is independent of time and an error 
                                     
9 Chiswick and Miller also use the language of the country in which the immigrant was born. 
10 This is a problem that is not raised in the economics of education literature, probably because individuals 
remember (or do not cheat about) their education level. 
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that is time-dependent, since an individual may have the same tendency to over- or under-
report.11  
 To make this clear, we follow Dustmann and Van Soest, and rewrite (1) as: 
 
(2)  
itiititit
vDxw +++= !"#ln  
 
where time subscripts as well as unobserved individual-specific effects !
i
are introduced, 
which may be correlated with Dit, and where the vit  are random error terms that are 
uncorrelated with xit and Dit. Since Dit is self-reported, it is usually measured with errors. Let 
the true value Dit and the observed value  %Dit be related as follows: 
 
(3)  
iititit
DD !" ++=
~  
 
where !
it
represents a time-independent unsystematic error and !
i
 represents a time-persistent 
error. Substitution of (3) in (2) leads to (4) and clarifies the possible correlations between the 
error terms and the language variable: 
 
(4)   )()(~)~(ln
ititiiitititiiitititit
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Estimating (4) by ordinary least squares yields biased results of !  if the error term 
)]()[(
ititii
v !"!#$ %+%  is correlated with
 
%D
it
. This can be due to measurement errors (in 
which case !
it
and !
i
 are correlated with 
 
%D
it
) or to correlation between the unobserved 
individual-specific !
i
 and
 
%D
it
. 
 To deal with the time-dependent measurement error, Dustmann and Van Soest suggest 
using leads and lags of self-reported language fluency as instruments for current fluency. 
They note, however, that this does not eliminate time-persistent errors, which introduce 
heterogeneity, and can be taken care of by the introduction of additional control variables 
(household characteristics, such as partner variables if one believes that mating is assortative). 
Finally, in order to remove all types of correlations simultaneously, they suggest using as 
instrument the education level of parents. The results obtained by Dustmann and Van Soest 
show that the bias due to time-independent misclassification errors is much larger than the 
one due to the usual type of unobserved heterogeneity. They also find that the bias due to 
time-persistent errors is quite small. This would imply that endogeneity problems generated 
by the first component of the error term in (4) could be considered negligible. 
 
 
 
 
                                     
11 Dustmann and Van Soest (2001) formulate a model that allows isolating the two types of errors if panel data 
are used to estimate the returns equation. 
  8 
Specification used in this paper 
 
In the equations that we estimate, we wanted to keep the model as close as possible to 
the Mincerian model used in the literature on returns on education. The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the wage rate. The vector xi contains the following control variables: 
two dummy variables that represent higher education (university) and secondary level 
education, respectively; the number of years of job tenure and its square; the number of years 
of potential experience and its square.  
 To introduce specific languages effects we use a unique scalar variable Di which 
measures the country-wide "disenfranchisement rate" (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005) of the 
language that individual i reports to be using at his workplace.12 This rate represents the 
percentage of the population that is not proficient in a foreign (or native) language, and is 
based on the results of a survey commissioned in 2000, by the Directorate of Education and 
Culture of the EU (See INRA, 2001). In each of the EU15 countries, 1,000 interviews were 
conducted on language proficiency. The information used by Ginsburgh and Weber takes into 
account answers to the following two questions:  
 
"(a) What is your mother tongue? (note to the interviewer: do not probe; do not read [the list 
of languages] out; if bilingual, state both languages); 
(b) What other languages do you know? (show card [containing a list of languages]; read out; 
multiple answers possible)." 
 
 There were four possible choices for (b), and the assumption made by Ginsburgh and 
Weber was that the first two choices that came to the mind of the individual interviewed were 
the languages that he knew best. There were also questions on whether the knowledge of each 
tongue mentioned was "very good," "good" or "basic," but the answers were not taken into 
account.  
 Dit is thus a scalar variable which takes the value 0 for an individual who uses no 
foreign language at his workplace13 and the value taken by the disenfranchisement rate for the 
five most widely internationally spoken languages in the European Union before the 2004 
enlargement (English, French, German, Italian and Spanish) in Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain for which returns on languages are 
estimated. The scalar nature of the Dit variable will also be useful in our quantile variable 
estimation procedure, which allows for only one variable that can be instrumented. 
Disenfranchisement rates for the five languages examined can be found in Table 2.  
                                     
12 If the individual reports that he uses several languages, the variable takes the value of the language for which 
the disenfranchisement rate is the largest. 
13 To avoid problems due to the possible presence of immigrants who do not know the official language the 
samples used in this research do not include immigrants. Hence, official languages disenfranchisement rates are 
equal to zero. 
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 The expected sign for parameter γ is positive, since the less a foreign language is 
known, that is, the higher the disenfranchisement rate, the higher is the expected return to the 
language. This formulation has the advantage that all foreign languages are subsumed by a 
unique variable, while the effect of each language can easily be retrieved by multiplying !  by 
the disenfranchisement rate of the language in a given country.  
 Recall that Dit can vary over time for several reasons: (a) changes within the firm (the 
firm starts exporting to some new markets or stops doing so between t-1 and t) reported by 
individual i; (b) an individual surveyed in 2000 has moved to another firm, where the 
language requirements are different; (c) self-reporting errors.  
 To deal with time-varying errors, we follow Dustmann and Van Soest and instrument 
Dit by its lagged (2000) value. Since in our case Dit represents language(s) used at the 
workplace, and not self-reported linguistic abilities, there is little room for time-persistent 
measurement errors as, in principle at least, the reported answer can be considered objective. 
Dit measures thus a "demand" side requirement by the firm that hires the worker. Then, even 
if the variable is correlated with the error term, we can quite safely assume that the correlation 
is not related to unobserved ability of the individual since supply-side and demand-side 
random terms can be assumed uncorrelated. Therefore, it is probably rather innocuous to 
ignore the time-persistent individual effect !
i
appearing in the equation. 
 Table 3 gives an overview of the changes in self-reporting between the two surveys. 
Details are available for all six languages in each country, but we only report on the total 
number of switches in percentage of the total number of observations used in the regressions 
for 2001. As can be seen, differences may be quite significant, accounting for as much as 24.3 
and 18.1 percent in Denmark and Finland, respectively. The lower part of Table 4 presents 
the regression coefficient of Di on Di,-1 (and other exogenous variables) in the regression in 
which Di is instrumented (first stage of GMM estimations). The results show that the R-
squared of these equations are not close to 1 (except for Germany), which illustrates again 
that there are quite large differences in reporting language use between the two waves of the 
survey. 
 The survey contains unfortunately no variables that could be used as instruments to 
correct for unobserved heterogeneity,14 but the results by Dustmann and Van Soest (2002) 
indicate that correcting for misclassification already produces meaningful results. Moreover, 
as was pointed out earlier, it is likely that there is no reason to expect such type of 
                                     
14 We tried to use partner’s education, but this had the effect of reducing the sample size (since we lose workers 
who have no partner). Moreover, according to Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test and the 
Cragg-Donald chi-squared test statistic, models estimated using only partner’s education as exogenous 
instrument are underidentified for all countries with the exceptions of Austria and Spain. In addition, when 
including both lagged disenfranchisement rate and partner’s education as exogenous instruments models are 
overidentified and, following Hall and Peixe (2003), partner’s education is a redundant instrument since the 
asymptotic efficiency of the estimation is not improved by using this instrument. 
. 
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heterogeneity in our case. Additional insights are given in the Appendix, where some 
estimations controlling for unobserved ability are presented, confirming our expectations. 
 
 
Results 
 
GMM estimation results of Equation (4) with t = 2001 and where Dit is instrumented by 
the lagged value Di,t-1 are reported in Table 4. As can be checked the parameter of interest, 
after instrumentation, is positive for all nine countries, and is estimated with small standard 
errors, with the exception of Denmark, where it is significantly different from zero at the 7 
percent probability level only. Some heterogeneity between countries is observed with the 
largest values obtained for Finland, France, Germany, Portugal and Spain and the lowest for 
Denmark. Other values are intermediate. In Table 5, these coefficients are transformed into 
returns to languages for the five most widely used languages in Europe. Since the dependent 
variable (wage rate) is defined in logarithms, the parameters can be interpreted as reflecting 
the percentage increase of the wage rate. Returns will be large if either the estimated country 
parameter or/and if the disenfranchisement rate for the language is large in the specific 
country, since returns are obtained as the product of the parameter and the disenfranchisement 
rate. Note however that in several countries, the number of workers who use a foreign 
language is quite small, and sometimes there is no such worker in the survey. Our 
specification allows nevertheless estimating potential returns (given that a firm needs an 
individual who knows the language), but to make this clear, returns for languages for which 
there are less than ten observations are in italics. Returns are large in Spain, France, Portugal, 
as well as for Romance languages in Germany, and they are far from being negligible in other 
countries. Though English is spoken in most countries, it still is in demand in France, 
Portugal and Spain, but so are French, German, Italian and Spanish in most countries.  
Table 6 compares OLS and instrumental variables results. As is the case in other papers 
(Bleakey and Chin, 2004, Galassi, 2003, and Dustmann and Van Soest, 2001, 2002), IV 
estimation leads to much larger returns than OLS. In the presence of measurement errors, one 
can expect OLS to generate a downward bias. On the other hand, OLS produce an upward 
bias in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. Our result can be considered as additional 
evidence for the larger importance of misclassification errors.  
As we already mentioned, the number of other variables is small on purpose, in order to 
remain close to a Mincer-type specification. In fact, usual control variables, such as 
occupation or firm size, may be (positively) correlated with Di and their inclusion could lead 
to underestimate foreign language returns. Both higher and secondary education have positive 
effects that are all significantly different from zero at conventional probability levels, but the 
effect of secondary education is smaller. Years of tenure have a positive influence, though it 
is not significantly different from zero in Austria, Finland, and Portugal. The relation is linear 
in other countries: the squared term is not significant in most cases, with the exception of 
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Portugal. Potential experience (number of years after last degree) also has, as expected, a 
positive impact, but returns are decreasing (the squared term is negative and significant in all 
countries). These results are close to those obtained by other researchers.  
 Williams (2005) who is interested, as we are, in the returns to languages in Europe 
also finds large effects in some cases. He uses languages dummies and estimates returns on 
log wages that are as large as 0.46 for Spanish in Denmark, 0.32 and 0.44 for French in 
Greece and Denmark and 0.96 for Italian in Portugal, though he does not correct for 
endogeneity or measurement errors. Fry and Lovell (2003) find that there is no need for 
bilingualism in the United States, but their estimates, also based on ordinary least squares, 
suffer from a downward bias. Galasi's (2003) IV estimates for Hungary are of the order of 
0.10. 
 
 
3. Instrumental variables quantile regression results 
 
The results of the previous section give the returns to languages at the mean of the 
sample log wage distribution. It is also interesting to know how language returns vary at 
different points of the conditional distribution of log wages. This is precisely what quantile 
regression allows doing.15 Moreover, since workers in the same quantile of the conditional 
wage distribution can be expected to have similar unobserved characteristics, quantile 
regression may help to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Increasing returns along 
quantiles could be a signal of a positive correlation between languages and unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
However, although quantile regression could limit this endogeneity problem, it is not 
clear that it will completely remove it. Recent research by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004, 
2005, 2006) has extended quantile regression approach to deal explicitly with endogeneity. 
They propose a new instrumental variable quantile estimator that is naturally robust to weak 
identification and that is used in this research, with the same specification and instruments as 
in the regressions presented in Section 2. The results of the calculations for the same nine 
European countries are presented in graphical form for nineteen quantiles (0.05, 0.10, ..., 0.90, 
0.95) in Figure 1. The shaded regions represent the 95 percent confidence intervals around the 
IV quantile regression estimates of the effect of the disenfranchisement rate on wages (plain 
curves). The horizontal discontinuous lines represent the GMM mean coefficients discussed 
in the previous section and the dotted straight lines delimit its 95 percent confidence interval. 
The effects of foreign language proficiency on earnings of both estimation methods are 
consistent, and lead to results that are very similar. Recall that the estimates can be interpreted 
as the percentage increase of wages for individuals who know a language other than the 
                                     
15 See Buchinsky (1998) and Koenker and Hallock (2001) for introductions to quantile regression. 
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domestic one and use it at their workplace (they still have to be converted using the 
disenfranchisement rate of the language in a specific country). 
 The following observations can be made. First, in most cases, and with the exception 
of Denmark and Greece, the estimated quantile effects are significantly different from zero at 
almost every quantile, showing that it pays to know (and use) foreign languages. They are, 
however, not significantly different from 0 for the lowest quantiles in Portugal and Spain. 
Second, we have found an important heterogeneity in the returns of foreign languages along 
the wage distribution for some countries suggesting that standard OLS or GMM estimations 
do not capture what is going on in all the quantiles. 
 In this sense, constant estimations along the wage distribution imply returns that are 
similar for all quantiles. This is so in Finland, France, Germany and Greece. For Italy the 
effect is stable for all quantiles, except the last ones, where the effect increases: for this 
country though language proficiency increases earnings in every point of the conditional 
distribution of wages, it is only at the very top of this distribution that the need for foreign 
languages gains in importance and is rewarded accordingly. We observe an increasing effect 
along the distribution in Austria, Denmark, Portugal and Spain. Hence, we find that 
increasing returns of foreign languages are not as common as expected under a strong positive 
correlation between unobserved ability and language returns. This can be interpreted as a new 
insight about the appropriateness of our instrument. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Our results show that in all nine countries, language proficiency has a positive effect 
on earnings.16 The parameter of interest is affected by a substantial downward bias if 
estimated by ordinary least squares, which takes no account of time-varying measurement 
errors. This result suggests that the bias related to measurement errors can be more important 
than the ability bias. Dustmann and Van Soest (2001), Bleakey and Chin (2004) or Galasi 
(2003) observe comparable outcomes. The results reported in Table 5 show that mean returns 
can be very large and that there is heterogeneity between countries. Quantile estimation 
suggests that there is also significant heterogeneity within countries: the effects are larger in 
the upper deciles of the wage distribution for half of the countries analyzed which is not very 
surprising. This may, however, also be a consequence of the fact that we do not control 
enough for unobserved ability when using OLS or IV estimators. 
 The returns to languages that we isolate are much larger than those which are found in 
most studies on immigrants who acquire the language of the country to which they move. 
This is not surprising, since immigrants usually form small groups in countries where the 
largest part of citizens are fluent in the native language, and there is less market pressure to 
                                     
16 Recall that this is not so in Ireland, but there are not enough observations to make a precise statement. 
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pay higher wages to immigrants who learn and speak the national language, compared to 
those who do not learn it. Moreover, immigrants are often less skilled than national citizens, 
and as is shown in our quantile regressions, returns to languages are larger for the top 
quantiles of the earnings distribution. For lower paid jobs, it probably makes less of a 
difference whether the immigrant does or does not speak the domestic language. 
 The paper uses a market measure (the disenfranchisement rate of a language in every 
country) rather than a dummy (or a measure of language efficiency) for various languages. 
This makes it possible to "predict" returns for languages that are spoken by a small number of 
individuals, and for which returns can hardly be estimated directly, because the number of 
observations is too small. The link also outlines in a direct way that private returns decrease 
as disenfranchisement decreases, an interesting question since it isolates a tradeoff between 
public investment in language education and private returns. Public education will eventually 
crowd out private returns, as the number of speakers of a language should increase with more 
language education.  
 Given that English is the most widely known language, its returns are smaller than 
those that accrue to other, less known, languages. This may eventually lead to self-regulating 
dynamics in the learning behavior of citizens, in which English will yield to other languages 
whose returns are still larger once required at job but maybe a more complex search problem 
has to be faced by the worker to find a firm where this language is used (matching). This 
observation is consistent with Aydemir and Skuterud (2005, p. 642) who find that earnings of 
more recent immigration cohorts to Canada are deteriorating. They ascribe this to greater 
challenges in the Canadian labor market, but also to the more general economic trend that has 
reduced the earnings of native labor market entrants. This may alternatively be due to the fact 
that more immigrants know English than previously, which reduces the incentive for workers 
to learn English and for firms to reward the knowledge of English. This would become clearer 
if disenfranchisement rates were used. 
 Our findings can also be interpreted as showing that in Europe there is need to teach 
other languages than English. 
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Appendix 
 
The survey includes questions on the improvement of language capacities from one 
year to the next. An individual can chose between an improvement that gives him a good 
proficiency level (that is making him able to read complex information and to converse in 
most social contexts) or a poor to medium level (he became able to read basic information 
and to converse in routine situations). We can assume that individuals who have improved 
their language skills have constant unobserved ability and that the average unobserved ability 
is similar regardless of whether they have been able to use their new skills at job or not. 
 This makes it possible to select those individuals who declare improvements in their 
foreign language skills between 2000 and 2001, so that time-persistent unobserved ability is 
constant. Clearly, the number of observations is much smaller, and we had to pool 
observations over countries (the same countries as before, with the exception of Germany for 
which there is no information on language proficiency) but this sample will not suffer for 
ability bias. Due to the sample reduction, the same model as in the country by country 
estimation is used, except that country specific effects are included.  
In Table A, we give the results for three equations. The first two equations are run on 
those individuals who declare having improved their language proficiency (to a good level, 
and to a poor or medium level). The third equation is run on the full sample, and is thus prone 
to a bias due to unobserved ability (but pools all countries, to make the results comparable to 
those of the two first equations). The results show that the parameters of the three equations 
are not significantly different. We ran a Wald-statistic to test whether the value of the 
disenfranchisement parameter γ is different from 0.45706 (the value for the whole sample in 
equation (3)) in equations (2) and (3). The values of the statistic are 1.03 and 0.35, 
respectively, well below any value of a χ2  with 1 degree of freedom for any standard 
probability level. Hence, it seems that the ability bias is not significant when using the full 
sample since the results are not statistically different from those obtained with samples where 
unobserved ability is controlled. 
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 Table A 
 Estimation Results 
 (Individuals who have improved their skills) 
 
    
    
Total sample
Good Poor-medium
 (1) (2) (3)
Disenfranchisement 0.32590 0.36184 0.45706
 (0.12936) (0.16116) (0.03169)
Higher Education 0.42001 0.40321 0.44834
 (0.03876) (0.0371) (0.01129)
Secondary Education 0.12164 0.11937 0.16988
 (0.03562) (0.03172) (0.00836)
Tenure 0.02275 0.01296 0.01044
 (0.00743) (0.00601) (0.00175)
Tenure sq. -0.00035 0.00004 0.00008
 (0.00031) (0.00025) (0.00007)
Pot. experience 0.02161 0.02557 0.02538
 (0.00488) (0.0037) (0.00097)
Pot. Exper. sq. -0.00032 -0.00040 -0.00043
 (0.00013) (0.00009) (0.00002)
Denmark 0.00341 -0.0161 0.01213
 (0.07979) (0.09871) (0.03791)
France -0.04207 -0.09858 -0.05772
 (0.0791) (0.09217) (0.03491)
Italy -0.32011 -0.39734 -0.37542
 (0.09153) (0.10092) (0.03535)
Greece -0.80615 -0.75814 -0.73390
 (0.09308) (0.1121) (0.03609)
Spain -0.41552 -0.50338 -0.43241
 (0.07418) (0.09977) (0.03467)
Portugal -0.85117 -0.88052 -0.97398
 (0.08152) (0.10191) (0.03556)
Austria -0.15039 -0.23348 -0.28041
 (0.08296) (0.09908) (0.03652)
Finland -0.18617 -0.24772 -0.22207
 (0.09006) (0.12627) (0.03762)
Intercept 1.66459 1.70187 1.66383
 (0.07281) (0.08079) (0.0351)
R2 0.5849 0.5355 0.6321
No. of observations 807 1088 12933
Improvement of language skills
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Table 1 
Overview of the data 
(No. of observations) 
 
  
  
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Italy Portugal Spain
No. of observations 1,166 864 1,029 928 1,649 2,383 1,304 2,214 2,242 2,401
Speakers of
English 204 198 532 454 350 411 222 230 287 256
French 2 175 3 0 1,649 3 16 44 80 87
German 1,166 37 107 9 44 2,383 4 53 7 19
Italian 1 8 0 1 7 6 3 2,214 1 8
Spanish 0 2 2 0 14 4 0 4 28 0
Dutch 0 75 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 2401
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Table 2 
Disenfranchisement rates (per cent) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 English French German Italian Spanish 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Austria 54 89 1 93 99  
Denmark 25 95 63 100 98  
Finland 39 99 93 100 99  
France 58 0 92 95 85  
Germany 46 84 3 99 98  
Greece 53 88 88 92 95  
Italy 61 71 96 1 97  
Portugal 65 72 98 99 96  
Spain 64 81 98 98 1  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Ginsburgh and Weber (2005, p. 279). 
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Table 3 
Language switches between 2000 and 2001 
(Number of individuals) 
 
          
 Austria Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Italy Portugal Spain 
          
          
No. of switches 61 250 167 128 37 149 159 195 210 
No. of observations 1,166 1,029 928 1,649 2,383 1,304 2,214 2,242 2,401 
          
Switches (in %) 6.1 24.3 18.0 7.8 1.6 11.4 7.2 8.7 8.8 
          
          
These numbers should be read as follows. In Austria, for example, 61 out of 1,166 workers who responded  
to both surveys declared that the language they use at their place of work changed between 2000 and 2001. 
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Table 4 
GMM Estimation results 
 
          
 Austria Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Italy Portugal Spain 
          
Second stage          
          
Disenfranchisement 0.283 0.189 0.503 0.505 0.495 0.275 0.292 0.471 0.608 
 (0.093) (0.103) (0.095) (0.058) (0.056) (0.099) (0.053) (0.076) (0.118) 
          
Higher Education 0.628 0.340 0.289 0.367 0.299 0.519 0.565 0.771 0.349 
 (0.049) (0.032) (0.033) (0.028) (0.032) (0.034) (0.029) (0.044) (0.028) 
          
Secondary Education 0.311 0.134 0.065 0.046 0.119 0.161 0.172 0.248 0.133 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.028) (0.042) (0.027) (0.021) (0.014) (0.027) (0.020) 
          
Tenure 0.006 0.013 0.001 0.027 0.018 0.020 0.012 -0.005 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
          
Tenure sq. (x100) 0.007 -0.047 0.028 -0.036 -0.012 -0.025 -0.013 0.067 0.019 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
          
Pot. Experience 0.032 0.026 0.016 0.272 0.037 0.031 0.026 0.022 0.021 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
          
Pot. exper. sq. (x100) -0.055 0.045 -0.025 -0.049 -0.072 -0.047 -0.045 -0.040 -0.035 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
          
Intercept 1.256 1.832 1.676 1.533 1.385 0.817 1.305 0.740 1.247 
 (0.039) (0.051) (0.040) (0.030) (0.052) (0.033) (0.023) (0.024) (0.217) 
          
R-squared 0.388 0.227 0.274 0.362 0.241 0.487 0.427 0.402 0.403 
          
          
First stage          
          
Disenfranch. lagged 0.628 0.488 0.611 0.635 0.914 0.487 0.616 0.552 0.449 
 (0.042) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029) (0.012) (0.040) (0.034) (0.032) (0.043) 
          
R-squared 0.449 0.246 0.479 0.457 0.887 0.303 0.337 0.412 0.222 
          
No. of observations 1,166 1,029 928 1,649 2,383 1,304 2,214 2,242 2,401 
          
          
Notes. The dependent variable is the (logged) wage rate. GMM standard deviations appear between  
brackets under the coefficients.
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Table 5 
Returns on languages 
 
          
                    
 Austria Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Italy Portugal Spain 
           
          
English 0.15 0.05 0.20 0.29 0.23 0.15 0.18 0.31 0.39 
French 0.25 0.18 0.50 0.00 0.42 0.24 0.21 0.34 0.49 
German 0.00 0.17 0.47 0.46 0.00 0.24 0.28 0.46 0.60 
Italian 0.26 0.18 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.25 0.00 0.47 0.60 
Spanish 0.28 0.18 0.50 0.43 0.49 0.26 0.28 0.45 0.00 
Dutch 0.28 0.19 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.26 0.29 0.47 0.61 
                    
          
Notes. Returns are obtained by multiplying the regression coefficient on disenfranchisement (first row) of Table 
4 by the disenfranchisement rates appearing in Table 3. Since there are no immigrants in the samples, the return 
of the domestic is always set to 0, even if in Table 2, disenfranchisement rates can be different from 0 (for 
instance, there are 3 per cent of German citizens who claim they do not speak German). Returns for languages 
for which there are more than 10 speakers in the sample appear in bold.  
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Table 6 
Comparing OLS and GMM returns 
 
          
 Austria Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Italy Portugal Spain 
          
OLS          
Disenfranchisement 0.199 0.093 0.275 0.312 0.409 0.205 0.192 0.325 0.277 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.052) (0.037) (0.050) (0.043) (0.027) (0.034) (0.032) 
R-squared 0.288 0.230 0.288 0.373 0.242 0.488 0.430 0.407 0.430 
          
GMM          
Disenfranchisement 0.283 0.189 0.503 0.505 0.495 0.275 0.292 0.471 0.608 
 (0.093) (0.103) (0.095) (0.058) (0.056) (0.099) (0.053) (0.076) (0.118) 
R-squared 0.449 0.246 0.479 0.457 0.887 0.303 0.337 0.412 0.222 
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Figure 1 
Quantile Regression Results 
Disenfranchisement Coefficients and their Confidence Intervals 
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The shaded regions represent the 95 percent confidence intervals around the IV quantile regression estimates of 
the effect of the disenfranchisement rate on wages (plain curves). The horizontal discontinuous lines represent 
GMM mean coefficients and the dotted straight lines delimit their 95 percent confidence intervals.  
 
 
